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This paper explores some of the insights
offered by a dynamic systems approach
into the nature of habits. “Dynamic sys-
tems approach” is used here as an umbrella
term for studies of cognition, behavior, or
development as systems of elements that
change over time (e.g., Thelen and Smith,
1994, 2006), while “dynamical systems” is
reserved for studies that use differential
equations to describe time-based systems
(e.g., Schöner and Kelso, 1988; Tschacher
and Dauwalder, 2003). The following dis-
cussion draws primarily from the coordi-
nation dynamics research of Kelso (1995,
2012), which stems from Haken’s theory
of synergetics (1977, 2003). However, the
view of habits presented here is more of an
interpretive application than a literature
review, as the work on which it draws does
not address habits explicitly. Perhaps this
is because conventional notions of habit
are too broad and loose to be captured
succinctly in dynamic terms. Dynamical
studies of human behavior have focused
on more specific capacities such as motor
coordination (Thelen et al., 1987), per-
ception (Tuller et al., 1994), and learning
(Kostrubiec et al., 2012). Yet this vari-
ety of applications suggests that the scope
of the dynamic approach overlaps signifi-
cantly with the domain of habits, so that
dynamic concepts could be used to chal-
lenge and refine our conventional notions
of habitual behavior. Accordingly, the goal
of this paper is to raise questions about
the nature of habits rather than present a
comprehensive scientific theory.
For a dynamic systems approach, sta-
bility is “the central concept” (Schöner
and Kelso, 1988, p. 1515). The “essential
issues are the stability of the system, as
indexed by the behavior of some collective
measure of the multiple components, and
the changes in stability over time” (Thelen
and Smith, 2006, p. 289). Intuitively, it
would seem that the characteristic stabil-
ity or stabilities of a system—its preferred
states—are its habits. But the connection
between stable states and habitual behav-
ior is not as straightforward as it appears.
The preferred states of a dynamic sys-
tem are not simply “built in”; rather they
depend on the interactive dynamics of
the system’s components as well as the
interactive couplings of the system with
its environment. The following discussion
explores the implications of four features
of dynamic system stability for our under-
standing of habit: (1) stability is relative to
timescale, and system stabilities at differ-
ent timescales are interdependent; (2) the
attractor landscape describing the charac-
teristic stabilities of a system can be altered
by various control parameters, including
situational parameters; (3) systems can
have multiple stabilities, such that the sta-
bility they exhibit at any given time may
depend on their recent history; (4) learn-
ing processes tend to affect a whole cluster
of interrelated stabilities and not just one
stability in isolation.
In light of these features of dynamic
stability, it seems that there is no straight-
forward way to map conventional notions
of personal habits onto stabilities of the
human person considered as a nested
dynamic system of body, brain, and envi-
ronment (Chiel and Beer, 1997). Should
we consider as habits only the “intrinsic”
stabilities of brain and body, regardless of
the variety of behaviors that can arise from
these stabilities in different situations? Or
should we only consider as habits those
patterns of behavior that are regularly
observed within a certain type of situation,
regardless of how differently these patterns
might be assembled at the body-brain
level? From the dynamic perspective, sta-
bility and change are ubiquitous features
at every level or spatiotemporal scale of
description. Thus, it seems arbitrary to
apply the term “habit” only to one kind or
level of stability, and perhaps this explains
why the term is seldom used in dynamic
systems literature. Yet it could be argued
that this multilevel complexity is an advan-
tage, as it can be used to challenge con-
ventional notions of habit in interesting
ways. Let us suppose that for any level of
human behavior that can be described as
a dynamic system, the stabilities or pre-
ferred states of that system—its “attrac-
tor landscape”—are at least analogous to
habits, and should be considered as such.
What is revealed by this broader, dynamic
perspective?
First, this view calls into question the
usual timescale of habits, which is typically
restricted to stable features of personality
and behavior on the timescale of months
or years (Lewis, 2000). From a dynamic
perspective, these stabilities are in princi-
ple no different from stabilities at faster
and slower timescales. Moreover, differ-
ent timescales of stability are interrelated:
while the habits of any given timescale are
shaped by the “deeper” habits of a slower
timescale, they also can lead to changes
at this deeper level. In other words, the
“force of habit” is not one-way: habits
are shaped by the behaviors that they
themselves constrain. For example, mood
is shaped by habits of personality, while
a string of similar moods can lead to
changes of personality. And though it may
seem strange to think of moods as tempo-
rary emotional habits on the timescale of
hours or days, their way of shaping and
being shaped by emotional states on the
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timescale of seconds or minutes is analo-
gous to the relationship between person-
ality and mood. Likewise one can treat
emotional states as habits that contribute
to the attractor landscapes for thoughts
and sensorimotor activity at an even faster
timescale, while personality itself can be
seen as evolving over the very “deep” land-
scape of developmental habits (Thelen and
Smith, 2006). Thus, a dynamic view opens
up a wider range of timescales across
which the concept of habit might apply.
But more importantly, even if we choose
to restrict habit to just one of these levels,
the interaction of timescales suggests that
our understanding of any one level should
draw upon at least two neighboring lev-
els (Kelso, 1995), if not the entire nested
system.
Second, a dynamic view of habit
will include regular variations of the
attractor landscape that occur in rela-
tion to changing parameters. In some
cases these variations can be represented
by a bifurcation diagram that shows
how the attractor landscape changes in
relation to a single control parameter
(Kelso and Engstrom, 2006, pp. 124–137).
Most human behaviors, however, require
that multiple parameters are taken into
account. Now, provided that the impor-
tant variables and parameters for describ-
ing characteristic variations of a certain
behavior for an individual can be deter-
mined (a very difficult task, in most
cases), one could, in theory, construct a
comprehensive “habit topology” for that
behavior: a map of how that behavior’s
preferred states change in relation to vari-
ous parameters. Notice that, depending on
the parameters involved, some stabilities of
this habit topology will be visited by the
systemmore or less regularly. For instance,
in the case of quadruped motion, assum-
ing that the parameter of speed varies reg-
ularly over its natural range, a quadruped
(e.g., horse) regularly visits the various
gaits (walk, trot, gallop) that make up the
preferred states of its habit topology (Hoyt
and Taylor, 1981; Schöner and Kelso, 1988,
p. 1516). However, for some behaviors,
especially those that are sensitive to multi-
ple parameters, certain regions of the habit
topology can remain “hidden” because
the required values of the relevant con-
trol parameters are rarely if ever encoun-
tered. Imagine, for example, that a person
who never dances might be found, on one
occasion, happily dancing the night away.
Conventionally speaking, this behavior is
not habitual. But from a dynamic view, it
is hard to say. Perhaps on that occasion the
person encountered just the right combi-
nation of circumstances—excellent mood,
pleasurable company, Afro-Cuban music,
fantastic mojitos, etc.—that made, for that
person, dancing a very deep (and enjoy-
able) stability. If these circumstances will
regularly facilitate the same behavior for
that person, cannot we say that dancing is
habitual for them in those circumstances?
The point here is not to insist on this
characterization, but to question our con-
ventional understanding of habits, which
typically involves assumptions about “nor-
mal” circumstances. Are habitual behav-
iors only rightfully considered as such if
we regularly encounter the circumstances
that facilitate their expression? If not, how
would we determine the unexpressed or
latent habits of a person, independently of
circumstances?
Third, it is important to consider
that the attractor landscape of a par-
ticular behavior commonly has multiple
stabilities even within restricted parame-
ter values (Schöner and Kelso, 1988, p.
1518). This phenomenon of multistability
implies that “habitual behavior” may not
be always the same even when all relevant
variables are the same. In such cases, which
stability describes the habit? The stability
into which the system enters may depend
on its recent history or on a symmetry
breaking. For example, as represented by
the much-studied HKB model (Chemero,
2009), coordinated finger movement—
waving the two index fingers in time with
a metronome, where tempo or speed is the
main control parameter—exhibits bista-
bility at slower speeds and monostabil-
ity at faster speeds (Kelso, 1995). Within
the slower, bistable regime, which of the
two stable states the system exhibits may
depend on its historical trajectory: for
instance, if the system has just entered
the bistable regime from the monostable
regime, it will remain in the preferred
state of the latter. Although coordinated
finger movement may not seem represen-
tative of human behavior, coordination
dynamics and its telltale characteristics—
such as multistability—have been found
in a wide range of behavioral and neural
systems (Schöner and Kelso, 1988; Kelso,
2012), suggesting an important implica-
tion: perhaps what a person presently
exhibits as habitual behavior within cer-
tain circumstances does not uniquely char-
acterize what is habitual for that person
even within those circumstances, but must
also be understood as a result of a partic-
ular historical trajectory. The importance
of history is also indicated by the phe-
nomenon of hysteresis (Haken, 2003, pp.
8–9), i.e., when the state or behavior of
a system is influenced by the residual sta-
bility of an antecedent regime. Thus, cer-
tain behaviors might persist even after the
attractor landscape has changed so that
they are no longer “habitual” within the
current context.
Finally, if we define learning in terms
of alterations to the attractor landscape
for a particular behavior such that some
states are newly stabilized while others are
destabilized (Kostrubiec et al., 2012), the
interrelatedness of habits as implied by the
previous three points indicates that habits
are rarely altered in a piecemeal fashion:
learning affects entire clusters of habits
that are composed of shared components.
That is, learning affects an entire “habit
space,” and not just individual habits in
isolation (Kelso, 1995, pp. 159–186). This
further complicates the picture of per-
sonal habits, as well as the kinds of
learning strategies we should adopt to
change them. For instance, it suggests that
certain habitual behaviors that are dif-
ficult to target can be altered indirectly
by focusing on other, related behaviors.
It also suggests that in many cases—
especially where a complex task demands
a finely articulated set of behaviors—
training should focus on shaping the
overall “habit space” rather than each indi-
vidual behavior. Moreover, as implied by
the definition of learning just given, the
dynamical approach suggests that habits
are a necessary condition for learning
and not just a product—contrary to the
so-called “blank slate” model (Kostrubiec
et al., 2012).
In conclusion, we see that a fairly sim-
ple definition of habit in terms of dynamic
stability yields a number of insights that
question our conventional notion of
personal habits as slow-changing, context-
independent, uniquely repetitive, and
discrete behaviors. At the same time, a
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dynamical view can give an account of the
relative fixity of behaviors that we take
to be habitual in the conventional sense.
However, by showing that this fixity is
dynamically and relationally constituted,
a dynamical view reveals the elaborate
context in which all habits are embed-
ded. Moreover, human habits appear to
be instances of a very general pattern: all
living systems exhibit self-organized stabil-
ities that reduce their degrees of freedom,
producing robust but flexible repertoires
of behavior.
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